In this paper, we apply game theory to identify equilibrium strategies for both attacker and defender in a fully endogenous model of resource allocation for countering terrorism and natural disasters. The key novel features of our model include balancing protection from terrorism and natural disasters, and describing the attacker choice by a continuous level of effort rather than a discrete choice (i.e., attack or not). Interestingly, in a sequential game, increased defensive investment can lead an attacker to either increase his level of effort (to help compensate for the reduced probability of damage from an attack), or decrease his level of effort (because attacking has become less profitable). This can either reduce or increase the effectiveness of investments in protection from intentional attack, and can therefore lead the defender to misestimate the effectiveness of protection from intentional attacks and misallocate her defensive resources if she fails to anticipate the attacker response. Similarly, in games with multiple targets, the fact that the attacker can change targets in response to defensive investments can reduce the incentive for the defender to protect against intentional attacks, and therefore increase the relative attractiveness of investing in protection from natural disasters.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 , and Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, the government is grappling with how to optimally protect the country from both terrorism and natural disasters, subject to limited resources. The all-hazards approach (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005) was originally proposed to address this kind of problem, but this approach does not explicitly consider the terrorist's analysis and response, and focuses more on emergency response than on prevention. To our knowledge, only Powell (2005) has formulated a model for allocating defensive investment between terrorism and natural disasters, taking into account the fact that the level of attacker effort is endogenous, and that is only an exploratory analysis. In this paper, we propose a similar model for balancing protection from terrorism and natural disasters and analyze it in detail, to provide insights into optimal defensive strategies in a post-9/11 and post-Katrina world.
Numerous researchers have studied protection from terrorism since 9/11. Much of this work has addressed the defender's optimization problem in the case of exogenous attacker effort levels (see for example Bier et al., 2005) . However, as noted by Bier (2005) , protecting targets against intentional attack is fundamentally different from protecting against natural disasters, since attackers can adapt their strategies in response to defensive investment. Therefore, some researchers have considered endogenous attacker decisions. With the exception of Major (2002) and Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2005) , most of this work has generally allowed only discrete attacker options; e.g., attack or not (Sandler and Arce M., 2003; Konrad, 2004; Bier et al., 2006) . Clearly, though, in order to efficiently protect targets from potential attack, a defender would like to know how much effort an attacker is likely to devote to any given target, not only whether it will be attacked. Farrow (2005) provides models for attacker and defender optimization problems separately, but fails to link them.
In this work, we represent the level of attacker effort as a continuous variable. This allows us to model the probability of damage from an attack as a function of the levels of both attacker effort and defensive investment. By analogy with the laws of supply and demand governing relations between producers and consumers, one can envision attackers and defenders jointly determining their levels of attacker effort and defensive investment, in either a simultaneous or a sequential game. Game theory and the concept of Nash equilibrium have been recognized as suitable tools for studying such strategy-interaction problems for a long time. For additional applications of game theory in the security context, see Woo (2002) , Harris (2004) , and Bier (2005) .
The 9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004) clearly states that terrorists make decisions in response to the potential victim's observed strategies. Such attack decisions in principle consist of several inter-related elements: when to attack; which target(s) to attack; how much effort to allocate to the attack; etc. The decision will also presumably depend on factors such as how much the attacker values causing damage to various targets, the attacker's level of resources, and any other opportunities he has for use of those resources (see for example Frey and Luechinger, 2003) .
On the defender's side, the problem is even more complicated. First, the defender faces a similar set of choices: when to defend; which targets to defend; how much effort to allocate to defense (both against terrorism and natural disaster); etc. The decision will again depend on the defender's valuations of the various targets, the level of available defensive resources, and the other possible uses of those resources. Moreover, since many types of defensive investments are made before an attack actually occurs, the defender also in general needs to anticipate and account for possible attacker responses to her decisions (in a sequential game).
In our (simplified) model of the above decision process, the attacker and defender are described by four attributes: (a) the technologies available to the attacker and defender (represented by the probability of damage from an attack, as a function of the levels of attacker effort and defensive investment, and the probability of damage from a natural disaster, as a function of the level of defensive investment); (b) the attacker's and defender's valuations of the various potential targets; (c) the attacker's and defender's (dis)utilities with regard to the damage caused by an attack; and (d) the attacker's and defender's disutilities for attacker effort and defensive investment, respectively.
In principle, the defender can deter an attacker in numerous ways-by increasing the opportunity cost of an attack such as making his civil life better, or by making potential targets less attractive, etc. (see for example Frey and Luechinger, 2003 , which is not addressed in our model). We focus specifically here on how the defender should allocate defensive investments intended to reduce the probability of damage from an attack. Similarly, although the defender can decrease damage from natural disaster in numerous ways, our focus centers on how the defender should allocate defensive investments intended to reduce the probability of damage from a natural disaster (rather than, say, to reduce the subsequent impact of that damage through emergency response, although the results in that case might be roughly similar). Variables other than the levels of attacker effort and defensive investment (such as the attractiveness of particular targets) are assumed to be exogenous in our model.
The result of this paper is a timely and rigorous model for balancing defense against terrorism and natural disasters. We view this paper as only one of several building blocks needed for for a more complete understanding of strategic defense against terrorism. For example, past work has addressed the effects of more complex system structures, rather than simple series and parallel systems (Azaiez and Bier, 2006) , and the effects of uncertainty about attacker goals and asset valuations . This paper also in turn provides a solid basis for studying additional types of defenses in future, such as all-hazards approaches and border security.
The next section of this paper introduces our notation and assumptions, and formulates a basic equi-librium model for a game between an attacker and a defender. Section 3 compares the simultaneous and sequential formulations of this game, and discusses the defender's "first-mover advantage" in the sequential game. For ease of exposition, Section 4 presents the results of our model for the simple case of only a single possible target; in particular, we find the attacker and defender best-response functions for this case, and characterize the equilibria for both the simultaneous and sequential games. Section 5 then extends these results to the case of a multi-target system; we explore the effects of risk attitudes on the attacker and defender decisions, and also investigate how the existence of multiple targets affects the defender's optimal strategy, in balancing protection from terrorism and from natural disasters. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 summarize the previous sections, discusses the policy implications of our work, and provides some future research directions.
Notation, Assumptions, and Problem Formulation
We define the parameters of our model as follows:
• Type 1 and type 2 threats: Intentional threats (e.g., terrorism) and non-intentional threats (e.g., natural disaster), respectively. We use subscripts "1" and "2" throughout this paper to refer to intentional and non-intentional threats, respectively.
• N : Number of possible targets.
• a i : Attacker's effort spent on target i, where a i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., N .
• d 1i and d 2i : Defender's investment in protecting target i from intentional and non-intentional threats, respectively, where
•
Attacker and defender strategies, respectively.
Set of feasible strategies for a and d, respectively.
• P 1i (a i , d 1i ): Probability of damage from an intentional threat against target i, as a function of the attacker's effort a i and the defender's investment d 1i .
• P 2i (d 2i ): Probability of damage from a non-intentional threat against target i, as a function of the defender's investment d 2i .
• X 1i : Bernoulli random variable that takes on a value of 1 when target i is damaged as the result of an intentional threat, with probability P 1i (a i , d 1i ), and 0 otherwise. For simplicity, the targets are assumed to be either completely damaged or not at all. (We recognize that this is a limiting case, since of course in the real world, targets might sustain partial levels of damage.)
• X 2i : Bernoulli random variable that takes on a value of 1 when target i is damaged as the result of a non-intentional threat, with probability P 2i (d 2i ), and 0 otherwise. We assume that X 2i is independent of X 1i for all i = 1, ..., N .
• w i and v i : Attacker and defender valuations of target i, respectively.
Attacker and defender valuations of all damaged targets, as a function of the strategy pair (a, d), where I {·} is an indicator function. For example, these valuations could represent the economic losses or casualties associated with damage to the various targets (see O'Hanlon et al., 2002) . Of course, in the real world, attacker and defender preferences are likely to depend on multiple attributes (e.g., economic losses, casualties, symbolic importance, etc.). However, limiting the model to a single measure of damage significantly increases its tractability, without dramatically restricting the applicability of the results.
We implicitly assume here that the attacker cares only about the damage from type 1 threats, while the defender cares about both. However, it is straightforward to show that the attacker and defender equilibrium strategies will remain the same (at least under the rare-event approximation), even if the attacker also cares about damage to the defender from non-intentional threats.
• u A [w(a, d) ] and u D [v(a, d) ]: Utility of total damage to the attacker and the defender, respectively. For convenience, we sometimes abbreviate
Disutility of total attacker effort and total defensive investment, respectively.
• U A (a, d) and U D (a, d): Total expected utility of the attacker and the defender, respectively.
Attacker and defender best responses, respectively.
• (a C * , d C * ) and (a S * , d S * ): Equilibria for the simultaneous and sequential games, respectively, where
(Strictly speaking, these are Nash equilibria for the simultaneous game, and subgame-perfect Nash equilibria for the sequential game, respectively.)
For convenience, we also define the elements of the above vectors as follows:
Assumptions about the Probability of Damage
) are assumed to be twice differentiable, and have the following properties (where superscripts denote partial derivatives) for all finite a i > 0, d 1i > 0, and d 2i > 0:
That is, the probability of damage from an intentional attack is zero when the level of attacker effort is zero, and when the level of defensive investment in protection from intentional attack goes to infinity.
• P
Thus, the probability of damage from an intentional attack is increasing in the level of attacker effort, with decreasing marginal returns to attack effort.
< 0, and P
> 0. Thus, the probability of damage from an intentional attack is decreasing in the level of defensive investment, with decreasing marginal returns to investment. (Note that the returns to attacker effort are measured in terms of increased probability of damage, while the returns to defensive investment are measured by decreased probability of damage; hence, the different signs of the second-order derivatives.)
In other words, when the attacker effort is zero, the marginal return of attacker effort, P
is decreasing in the level of defensive investment.
> 0. Thus, the probability of damage from a non-intentional threat is decreasing in the level of defensive investment, with decreasing marginal returns to investment.
The assumptions of decreasing marginal returns to both attacker effort and defensive investment are crucial to the analysis presented here. Although these assumptions are likely to be satisfied in many cases involving continuous capital investment, we recognize that it is not necessary for the marginal returns to be decreasing over all levels of effort or investment (for example, if some minimal level of investment is needed before defenses become highly cost effective). Recently, a family of probability functions called contest success functions (Skaperdas, 1996; Hirshleifer, 1989 ) have been studied, in which increasing marginal returns can be found in some cases.
Assumptions about Utility Functions
The attacker and defender disutility functions for attacker effort and defensive investment, g A and g D , are assumed to be twice differentiable and have the following properties: g j (0) = 0; g j > 0; and g j ≥ 0 for j = A, D. Increasing marginal disutility of attacker effort is likely to hold in practice-e.g., due to the increasing difficulty of obtaining higher levels of attack resources, or the difficulty of implementing more demanding attacks. However, this need not always be the case; for example, if we consider both productive and appropriative activities of the attacker (Grossman and Kim, 1995) , then the marginal disutility of attack effort could be decreasing, provided that productive activities (i.e., opportunity costs) can be characterized by increasing marginal returns (at least over some ranges of effort levels).
Note that the functions g A and g D can also be used to represent (at least approximately) the effects of finite budget constraints by choosing g A and g D to satisfy
where B A and B D are the available budgets of the attacker and defender, respectively. This works because neither the attacker nor the defender will devote more resources than the available budgets to attack or defense at optimality if the disutility of that investment is greater than the utility of damage to all possible targets. Therefore, it is adequate to consider an unconstrained model.
The attacker and defender utility functions for damage, u A and u D , are assumed to be twice differentiable with the following properties: u A (0) = 0; u A > 0; u D (0) = 0; and u D < 0. In other words, the attacker utility is non-negative and increasing in total damage, while the defender utility is non-positive and decreasing in total damage. We allow both the attacker and defender to be risk seeking, risk neutral, or risk averse, and explore the implications of different risk attitudes in Section 5. From utility theory, the attacker (defender) is risk seeking, risk neutral, or risk averse if and only if
We assume that the total expected utility equals the sum of the expected utility of total damage and the disutility of attacker effort or defensive investment (i.e., both the attacker and defender utility functions satisfy additive independence). In other words, we have
where E{·} denotes expectation. We recognize that a general multi-attribute utility function might be more appropriate than additive independence. However, the assumption of additive independence of damage and cost seems to capture the most critical features of the attacker and defender decision problems (the need for each player to trade off the level of effort expended against the probability of damage resulting from attacks), while keeping the model relatively tractable. More general multi-attribute utility functions would allow effort and damage to be modeled as substitutes or complements to each other. (For example, one could easily imagine that an attacker might have greater tolerance for high effort if accompanied by high levels of damage.) However, this seems likely to be a second-order effect in most cases, especially since the costs in our model are not treated as being probabilistic.
Assumptions of Common Knowledge and Problem Formulation
As in most applications of game theory, we assume that the attacker and defender have common knowledge about the rules of the game, including the functions
, g j , and u j , and the parameters N , w i , and v i for all i = 1, ..., N and j = A, D. We recognize that this assumption is limiting, as pointed out by Guikema (2006) . However, as stated previously, we view this paper as only one of several building blocks needed for a more complete understanding of strategic defense against terrorism. For example, previous work has addressed the case where the defender does not know the attacker's valuations of the targets. While this does result in some defender hedging compared to the case of common knowledge, allowing the defender to be uncertain about the attacker valuations does not radically change the nature of that game or its solution. Therefore, we would not expect reasonable relaxations of the assumption of common knowledge to result in substantial changes to the results of this paper either.
We also assume each party knows that the other party wishes to maximize total expected utility. In other words, the goal of the attacker is to maximize his total expected utility by choosing a suitable level of attacker effort to devote to each target; that is,
Similarly, the goal of the defender is to maximize her total expected utility by choosing a suitable level of defensive investment for each target; that is,
Simultaneous vs. Sequential Games and First-Mover Advantage
We consider both simultaneous and sequential games between the attacker and the defender, as follows:
1. Simultaneous game: The attacker and the defender decide on the attacker effort and defensive investment simultaneously. Note that this model can also apply even if the attacker and defender do not make their decisions at the same time, as long as neither party knows the other's decision at the time it makes its own decision. Thus, a Nash equilibrium for this simultaneous game, (a C * , d C * ), must be a solution to optimization problems (1) and (2); i.e., it must satisfy a
2. Sequential game: The defender decides on and implements a defensive investment strategy first, and then the attacker chooses his levels of attacker effort after observing the defensive investments. (The case in which the attacker moves first is not of interest here, because this type of model would apply primarily to real-time defensive tactics, such as apprehending an attacker during the course of an attack, while we wish to focus on strategic interactions such as capital investments.) When the defender moves first, the attacker faces optimization problem (1). However, since the defender knows that the attacker will implement his best-response strategyâ(d), the optimization problem for the defender (2) takes a special form:
Thus, a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for this sequential game, (a S * , d S * ), must be a solution to optimization problems (1) and (3)
Some interesting applications of mixed-strategy equilibria are discussed in Cavusoglu and Raghunathan (2004) , for the case with only a small number of discrete decision strategies. By contrast, we find in our analysis that there are frequently pure-strategy equilibria in our game. At an intuitive level, this is because we consider continuous rather than discrete decision variables (along with the fact that the success probability of an attack is convex in the defensive investment and concave in the attacker effort). 
The result follows directly from the fact that the defender always has the option to choose d
. Remark: Theorem 1 indicates that the defender may have a "first-mover advantage" in the sequential game. Therefore, our results imply that the defender will frequently to choose a sequential game (in which she advertises her defensive investments instead of keeping them secret), in order to use her first-mover advantage. Similar results from attacker-defender models can be found in Bier et al. (2006) . For general discussion of first mover advantage in the economic literature, see for example Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) .
The Case of a Single Target
In this section, we explore the case where there is exactly one target in the system; i.e., N = 1. Thus, there exist exactly two possible outcomes for the attacker:
1. The attack succeeds, which occurs with probability P 11 (a 1 , d 11 ), and leads to a positive utility of damage u A1 = u A (w 1 ).
2. The attack fails, leading to a zero utility of damage for the attacker.
The attacker's optimization problem (1) thus becomes
From (4), we can see that the attacker's best response depends on d 11 , but does not depend on d 21 . Therefore, in the single-target problem,â(d) can be reduced toâ 1 (d 11 ).
In formulating the defender's optimization problem, we need the probability of damage in order to compute expected damage. Strictly speaking, the probability of damage to target i from at least one threat equals 1 − (1 − P 1i )(1 − P 2i ) = P 1i + P 2i − P 1i P 2i , which we will approximate by P 1i + P 2i for simplicity. This rare-event approximation will be reasonably accurate when P 1i and P 2i are relatively small (e.g., less than 0.1). Under this approximation, optimization problem (2) for a simultaneous game becomes
where
Similarly, the defender's optimization problem (3) for a sequential game becomes
Theorem 2. Pure-strategy equilibria exist for both the simultaneous game characterized by equations (4) and (5), and the sequential game characterized by equations (4) and (6).
Proof: This result follows trivially from Lemmas 1 and 2 in the appendix, using the existence theorem for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (see Theorem 1 in Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986 ; credits are given to Debreu, 1952; Glicksberg, 1952; Fan, 1952) .
Solution to the Attacker's Optimization Problem
Theorem 3. The solution to optimization problem (4) is given by:
is the total marginal payoff for the attacker. We have that the sign of
is the same as the sign of
Proof: See Appendix. Remark: Theorem 3 above makes clear the relationship between our model and the study of strategic interactions in the literature on industrial organization (Tirole, 1988, Part II) . In particular, the probability of damage from terrorism, P 11 (a 1 , d 11 ), can be considered an analogue of a strategic reaction function. When the cross derivative is positive, the attacker effort and defensive investment are strategic complements, so that increased investment in defense will increase the level of attacker effort. A similar effect in the Cold War was described as "escalation" (Brams, 1985) , as opposed to deterrence. By contrast, when the cross derivative is negative, the attacker effort and defensive investment are strategic substitutes, so that increased investment in defense will decrease the level of attacker effort.
Theorem 3 also indicates that there are two types of targets from the attacker's perspective:
, then target 1 never interests the attacker at all (i.e.,â 1 (d 11 ) = 0 for all d 11 ≥ 0); (b) otherwise, target 1 will interest the attacker if the level of defensive investment is sufficiently small. Obviously, no defensive investment against intentional threats should be expended if the target is of the first type. If the target is potentially of interest to the attacker, then any positive attacker best-response effort must be such that the marginal attack payoff equals the marginal disutility of attacker effort.
as the probability of damage from a attack, with constants c i > 0, for target i = 1, ..., N . (Intuitively, one can think of the constant c i as representing the inherent security level of target i before any defensive investment has been spent.) We consider two cases-one in which the attacker preference is linear in attacker effort, and the other in which the attacker has increasing marginal disutility of attacker effort.
Case 1. g A (x) = x. The attacker best-response function is: 4 − c 1 ≤ d 11 <d 11 , and finally zero for d 11 ≥d 11 , at which point the attacker will be completely deterred.
Case 2. g A (x) = x 2 . The attacker best-response function for this case is shown in Figure 1 (b) for various values of u A1 . There are two possible shapes for the attacker best-response function in this case: one is always decreasing in the level of defensive investment and converging to zero; and the other is initially increasing, then decreasing, and eventually converging to zero.
As seen from the above example, the attacker's best-response functionâ 1 (d 11 ) can be initially increasing in d 11 . However, by Theorem 3, it must eventually converge to zero (if initially positive) as d 11 grows. In other words, at low levels of defensive investment, increases in defensive investment might lead the attacker to allocate more effort to attacks, in order to partially compensate for the reduced effectiveness of attacker effort. However, at high levels of defensive investment, spending more effort on attacks will no longer be costeffective for the attacker. Thus, the attacker will eventually be deterred as the level of defensive investment increases.
Solution to the Defender's Optimization Problem in the Simultaneous Game
Theorem 4. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the best-response functionsd 11 (a 1 ) andd 21 (a 1 ) to optimization problem (5) are given by any of the following four cases:
are the total marginal payoffs for the defender from protection against terrorism and natural disaster, respectively. Moreover, we haved 11 (0) = 0, and lim a 1 →∞d 11 (a 1 ) = 0. Proof: See Appendix. Remark: Theorem 4 above indicates that if the defensive investments against both intentional and non-intentional threats are positive at equilibrium, then the marginal payoffs to the defender from these two types of protection must be equal, and must also equal the marginal disutility of defensive investment. Note also that the optimal defensive investment in protection against non-intentional threats depends on the level of attacker effort only indirectly, through the optimal defensive investment against intentional threats. Moreover, if the disutility function g D of defensive investment is linear, then the optimal defensive investment in protection against non-intentional threats will be independent of both the level of attacker effort and the optimal defensive investment in protection against intentional attacks.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the defender best-response functions when the disutility of defensive investment is linear, and Figures 2(c) and 2(d) show the corresponding functions when the disutility of defensive investment is strictly convex. In both cases, the optimal defensive investment in protection from intentional threat,d 11 (a 1 ), will equal zero for all values of a 1 when the defender's utility of damage is sufficiently low, and otherwise will be initially increasing in a 1 and then decreasing to zero as a 1 grows, as shown in Figures  2(a) and 2(c) . In other words, at low levels of attacker effort, increases in attacker effort might lead the defender to allocate more resources to defense, in order to partially compensate for the reduced effectiveness of defensive investment. However, at high levels of attacker effort, spending more on defense will no longer be cost-effective for the defender.
By contrast, Figure 2 (b) shows that the best-response functiond 21 (a 1 ) for defensive investment in protection from natural disasters is constant in the attacker effort a 1 when the disutility of defensive investment is linear. For the case where the disutility of defensive investment is strictly convex (i.e., increasing marginal disutility of investment),d 21 (a 1 ) is initially decreasing in a 1 , and then increases to its original level,d 21 (0), as shown in Figure 2(d) .
Note also that if the disutility of attacker effort is strictly convex, comparing Figures 2(c) and 2(d) suggests that protection from terrorism is a substitute for protection from natural disaster. In other words, due to the first-order conditions for the defender and the increasing marginal disutility of defensive investment, changes in attacker behavior that lead the defender to invest more against one type of threat must also lead to reduced defensive investment against the other type of threat. Thus, at low levels of attacker effort, increases in attacker effort might lead the defender to allocate more resources to defense against terrorism, as shown in Figure 2 (c) (in order to partially compensate for the reduced effectiveness of defensive investment), but will also lead the defender to allocate less to defense against natural disaster, as shown in Figure 2(d) . By contrast, at high levels of attacker effort, spending on defense against terrorism will no longer be cost-effective for the defender, so she will spend more on defense against natural disasters.
Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 4. Remark: Essentially, Theorem 5 says that for a given level of attacker effort a 1 , if protection from natural disasters is more cost-effective than protection from terrorism at all possible levels of defensive investment (d 11 and d 21 ), then the defender should spend nothing on protection from terrorism, and vice versa. Note also that the level of attacker effort a 1 can change the relative effectiveness of protection against the two types of threats. For example, at zero attacker effort, the cost-effectiveness of protection from terrorism will be zero, which will trivially be less than the cost-effectiveness of protection from natural disaster. Therefore, the defender should spend nothing on protection from terrorism in this case. However, there may be levels of attacker effort at which protection from terrorism is more cost-effective than protection from natural disaster for all feasible levels of defensive investment d 11 and d 21 , in which case the defender should spend nothing on protection from natural disasters.
Equilibrium for the Simultaneous Game
Combining the results from Sections 4.1 and 4.2 yields the equilibrium for a simultaneous game as defined in Section 3. Alternatively, if we plot the attacker and defender best-response functionsâ 1 (d 11 ) andd 11 (a 1 ) on a single graph, then the intersection point (a This will happen when the target is sufficiently valuable to both the attacker and the defender to justify positive allocations of attacker effort and defensive investment, respectively, and neither party's (equilibrium) effort is sufficient to completely deter the other party. Note, by the way, that the defender best response functiond 11 (a 1 ) in Figure  3 (e) is initially increasing then decreasing, just as in Figures 3(d) and 3(f) . However, the scale of Figure 3 (e) has been changed to more clearly show the behavior in the region of the equilibrium, so the decreasing section of the defender best response function cannot be seen.
(a
This outcome is impossible, since by Theorem 4 we know thatd 11 (0) = 0. In other words, there is no simultaneous equilibrium in which the attacker implements zero attacker effort, but the defender chooses to implement a positive defensive investment.
Remark: From the discussion above, we see that in the simultaneous game, the defender cannot completely eliminate the risk of attack at equilibrium by her defensive investment, unless the target is not of interest to the attacker in any case. Note that the third case, (a Figures 3(e) -(f), will tend to be of the greatest interest in practice.
Solution to the Defender's Optimization Problem in the Sequential Game
We define the probability of damage from an attack in a sequential game to beP
Taking the derivative ofP 11 (d 11 ) with respect to d 11 , we get
can be derived from (7). Since we saw in Section 4.1 that
could be either positive or negative, the overall effect of defensive investment on the equilibrium attacker effort is indeterminate. By assumption, we know that P (d11) 11 < 0 and P (a1) 11 > 0. Therefore, equation (8) implies that the effect of defensive investment in protection from terrorism consists of two parts: a direct reduction in the probability of damage due to the defensive investment, reflected by P
[â 1 (d 11 ), d 11 ]; and an indirect increase or reduction in the probability of damage due to the attacker's modified level of effort in a sequential game, as expressed by P
. Ignoring the latter effect will lead to overestimates of the effectiveness of defensive investment against terrorism whenever
Theorem 6. The necessary conditions for the solution to optimization problem (6) are given below:
are the total marginal payoffs for the defender to protection from terrorism and natural disaster, respectively. Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, except that only necessary conditions for the solution are given.
Remark: As in the simultaneous game, Theorem 6 indicates that if the defender makes positive investments in protection from both terrorism and natural disaster at equilibrium, then the marginal payoff to the defender from protection against terrorism must equal that of protection against natural disaster, and both must equal the marginal disutility of defensive investment. This result is similar to that of Powell (2005) for a sequential game. Also, if the disutility of defensive investment is linear, then the optimal defensive investment in protection against natural disaster will be independent of the defensive investment in protection against terrorism.
Equilibrium for the Sequential Game
Combining the results from Sections 4.1 and 4.4 gives the equilibrium for the sequential game defined in Section 3. Alternatively, graphical analysis provides another way to get the equilibrium to the sequential game. As shown in Figure 4 Figure 4 (using the same parameters and functions as in Figure 3 ). Comparing the results in Figure 4 with those in Figure 3 , we see that the sequential equilibria are identical to those of the corresponding simultaneous game in all cases except for Figure 4 (e). For the cases shown in Figures 4(a) through 4(d), this is trivially so, because either the attacker's or the defender's best-response function is zero everywhere. For the case shown in Figure 4 (e), the attacker is completely deterred in the sequential game, even though the corresponding simultaneous game has non-zero attacker effort at equilibrium, as shown in Figure 3 (e). Thus, it is possible for the defender to completely deter the attacker in the sequential game, even when the target is sufficiently valuable to be of interest to the attacker in principle (mathematically, this is because we have lim
The Case of Multiple Targets
In this section, we discuss the case where there is more than one potential target in the system; i.e., N ≥ 2. We first consider the case where both the attacker and the defender are risk neutral with respect to the level of damage from an attack, and have linear disutility of attacker effort or defensive investment. Then, we explore the effects of risk attitude and convex disutility of effort (i.e., increasing marginal disutility) on the equilibria.
Note that in the case of multiple targets, we cannot guarantee that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, nor that the defender can always constrain the attacker's choices in a sequential game. This is because the attacker and defender objective functions may not be quasi-concave, so their best responses may not be unique. (Recall that a function f defined on a convex subset U of n is quasi-concave if for every real number a, C a ≡ {x ∈ U : f (x) ≥ a} is a convex set.) Note, however, that the existence of a unique best response requires only that the objective function have a unique global optimum; the existence of multiple local optima does not in and of itself cause a problem. Thus, there are likely to be pure-strategy equilibria even in many multiple-target games (especially when the targets are not homogeneous), unless there are multiple local optima, with the same (global optimum) values of the attacker or defender objective functions.
Risk Neutrality for Damage and Linear Disutility of Effort
The attacker is risk neutral with respect to damage if and only if u A = 0. In that case, we will have
the attacker has linear disutility function of attack effort if and only if g
which can be reduced to N single-variable optimization problems as follows:
Similar to the attacker's optimization problem, and using the rare-event approximation (as in Section 4), if the defender is also risk neutral with respect to damage and has linear disutility of defensive investment, then optimization problems (2) and (3) can be reduced to single-variable optimization problems as follows:
for the simultaneous game, where b D is a constant, and
for the the sequential game. Thus, we see that if both the defender and the attacker are risk neutral with respect to damage and have linear disutilities of attacker effort and defensive investment, the multiple-target game reduces to N independent single-target games, so the results of Section 4 apply in this case, implying that there will always be a pure-strategy equilibrium. This result depends critically on the assumption that the disutilities of both attacker effort and defensive investment are linear (for example, that neither the attacker nor the defender has a budget constraint, so that both the attacker and the defender can allocate as much effort as desired to one target without having to reduce their allocations to other targets).
Effects of Risk Attitude
We suggest that attackers and defenders may reasonably be modeled as risk seeking and risk averse over damage levels, respectively. Although we have not been able to find equilibria for this case in a multi-target game, the following theorems provide useful hints for policy considerations: Remark: Note that since Theorem 7 is focused on whether the attacker is potentially interested in implementing an attack (i.e., whether the attacker will attack when the defensive investment is zero), it applies to both simultaneous and sequential games, (and similarly Theorem 8 for defenders). We expect that results similar to those of Theorems 7 and 8 will also hold for systems consisting of more than two targets, although we have not shown this.
Theorem 7 in particular may help to explain why the terrorists involved in the 9/11 tragedy chose to attack four targets simultaneously. Similar examples include: the four attacks on the London public transport system on July 7, 2005; the four attempted attacks on the London transport system on July 21, 2005; the ten commuter-train explosions in Madrid on March 11, 2004 ; and the long series of suicide bombings in both Iraq and Israel. In some of these cases, any one target by itself may conceivably not have been sufficiently attractive individually to be worth attacking, but the prospect of being able to cause larger amounts of damage by attacking multiple targets could have been sufficient to motivate the attacker. Similarly, a risk averse defender may optimally defend more targets than a risk neutral or risk seeking defender (possibly even including some targets for which the defensive cost is greater than the expected loss due to an attack on that target alone), because of the effect of risk aversion.
Convex Disutility of Effort
Theorems 4 and 6 indicate that if the disutility of defensive investment is linear, then the optimal level of defensive investment in protection from non-intentional threats at equilibrium will be independent of both the attacker effort and the defensive investment in protection from intentional threats. However, this is not true for N ≥ 2 when the disutility of effort is convex (as seems likely to be the case in practice), as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2. Consider a two-target game with the following parameters: u A1 = 100 and u A2 = 3000 (the attacker's utilities of damage to targets 1 and 2, respectively); u D1 = 200 and u D2 = 150 (the defender's disutilities of damage to targets 1 and 2, respectively); P 11 (a 1 , d 11 ) = a1 10(a1+d11+1) and P 12 (a 2 , d 12 ) = a2 10(a2+d12+1) (the probabilities of damage to targets 1 and 2, respectively, from an intentional attack); P 21 (d 21 ) = 1 10(3+d 21 ) and P 22 (d 22 ) = 1 10(100+d 22 ) (the probabilities of damage to targets 1 and 2, respectively, from natural disaster); and g A (x) = g D (x) = x 2 (nonlinear disutilities of total attacker effort and total defensive investment, respectively). We also assume that both the attacker and the defender are risk neutral with respect to the level of damage from an attack. Numerical computation yields the simultaneous equilibrium for this game as a
C * 12 = 0.5, and d C * 22 = 0. In other words, the defender protects target 1 from natural disaster and target 2 from terrorism (knowing that target 2 is more attractive to the attacker than target 1). However, in a single-target game involving only the first target, the simultaneous equilibrium would be a C * 1 = 1, d C * 11 = 1, and d C * 21 = 0. Thus, the existence of the second target causes the defender to switch from optimally protecting target 1 against terrorism to protecting it against natural disaster at optimality (and also causes the defender to reduce her total defensive investment from 1 to 0.4 + 0.5 = 0.9).
Remark:
The above example indicates that even if protection from terrorism is more cost-effective than protection from natural disasters for a single target, this may no longer be true when additional targets are considered. This is because the terrorist can now redirect his effort among the possible targets in response to the defender's investments. This drastically reduces the defender's ability to allocate her investments in protection from terrorism to take advantage of those targets that are most cost-effective to defend , if those are not also the most attractive targets to the attacker. In particular, this phenomenon can reduce or eliminate the desirability of protecting less attractive targets (such as relatively small cities) from terrorism.
Future Research Directions
The results of this paper are intended to provide mainly qualitative insights, since in practice, it might be difficult to estimate the parameters and functions used in this model. However, the work of Beitel et al. (2004) suggests that this estimation task is not altogether impractical, opening up the possibility of applying this type of model to give quantitative as well as qualitative results in future.
In our model, the only decision variable for the defender is the level of defensive investment. Of course, in practice, other possible defender strategies might include deceiving the attacker into mistaken valuations of the various possible targets, and increasing the attacker's disutility of attack effort (e.g., by limiting the attacker's resources, or by providing more attractive opportunities for the use of those resources; see for example Frey and Luechinger, 2003) . Models addressing such defender options would be desirable to pursue.
Further research on the multi-target case would also be desirable (possibly using computed equilibria if analytical equilibria prove difficult to find). Note in particular that as in Bier et al. (2006) , the targets of greatest interest to the attacker will tend to receive not only the greatest attacker effort at equilibrium, but also the greatest defensive investment. Thus, in many cases, it may be adequate to analyze a reduced game involving a relatively small number of high-value targets, rather than a more complete game involving much larger numbers of targets.
Bayesian methods could make it possible to relax the assumption of perfect information. Moreover, dynamic games (with more than two stages) and population games (with more than one attacker and/or defender) would also be of interest.
Finally, we are interested in exploring the possibility of a "contract" between the attacker and defender, in which the defender gives the attacker "rent" in return for the attacker giving up his attack efforts. In order to prevent other agents from masquerading as attackers and claiming this rent, a mechanism that yields a separating equilibrium is necessary. For example, the attacker may be required to surrender weapons or other attack resources in order to claim the rent. This idea still requires further development to investigate its applicability, however.
Summary and Conclusions
In the single-target case, our results indicate that increased defensive investment can lead the attacker to either increase his level of effort (to help compensate for the reduced probability of damage from an attack), or decrease his level of effort (because attacking is less profitable at high levels of defensive investment). This can either reduce or increase the effectiveness of investments in protection from intentional attack, and will therefore affect the defender's optimal allocation of resources between protection from intentional attacks and from natural disasters. In particular, this implies that when increased defensive investment causes the attacker to redouble his efforts, defensive investment against terrorism will not decrease the probability of a successful attack as much as the defender might have expected based on an exogenous model of attacker effort.
Thus, the assumption of endogenous attacker effort in this work is critical to capturing important insights into the nature of equilibrium defensive strategies. In particular, therefore, our results emphasize the importance of intelligence in counter-terrorism-to anticipate not only the attacker's choice of targets, but also the likely attacker responses to defensive investments.
Finally, note that protection from terrorism will tend to become less cost-effective for the defender as the number of targets grows, due to the ability of the attacker to redirect his attack effort to less defended targets. Thus, even a target that would have been worth protecting from terrorism in a single-target game may no longer be worth defending from terrorism in a multi-target game. This will in general tend to reduce the effectiveness of protecting large numbers of targets against intentional attacks, and therefore increase the relative desirability of protection from natural disaster and of all-hazards approaches. This suggests, for example, that the strong emphasis on terrorism defense over natural disaster preparedness at the U. A .) Thus, any optimal attacker strategy must be contained in a compact and convex subset of A, given by A = {(a 1 , ..., a N 
We can use a similar argument to get a compact and convex set D ⊂ D, which must contain the optimal defender strategy.
Lemma 2. In single-target game, the attacker and defender objective functions, as defined in optimization problems (4) and (5), respectively, are strictly concave. Moreover, best response functionsâ 1 (d 11 ) and d 11 (a 1 ) exist uniquely.
Proof for Lemma 2: First, the attacker's objective function in (4) is strictly concave since
Second, we show that the defender's objective function in (5) is strictly concave (i.e., the Hessian matrix is negative definite) by calculating the following components in the Hessian matrix:
Finally, since both the attacker and defender objective functions are strictly concave and twice differentiable, and their domains can be reduced to compact and convex sets (see Lemma 1),â 1 (d 11 ) andd 11 (a 1 ) must exist uniquely.
Proof for Lemma 3: Since we assumed that P (ai,d1i) 1i
for any a i ≥ 0 and d 1i ≥ 0. Therefore, we will have P (ai) d 1i ) . Finally, since we assumed that g A ≥ 0, we will have a i = 0 maximizes −g A (a i ). Combining these two results finishes the proof.
Proof for Lemma 4: Since we assumed that P
is decreasing in a i but must always be positive. Therefore, we must have lim
for some L ≥ 0 (i.e., the limit must exist and be non-negative). Suppose that L > 0. Then there must exist
By the mean-value theorem, we know that there d 1i ) must go to infinity as a i goes to infinity. However, this contradicts the fact that a probability must be less than or equal to one. Since a contradiction has been found by supposing L > 0, we must have lim 
Proof for Lemma 5:
By the intermediate-value theorem, we have Proof for Theorem 3: Since the attacker's objective function in (4) is strictly concave (Lemma 2), and the set of feasible strategies A can be replaced by a smaller convex set (Lemma 1), the following first-order condition for an interior solutionâ 1 (d 11 ) > 0,
is indeed a necessary and sufficient condition for an interior solutionâ 1 (d 11 ) > 0. There are two possibilities:
A (a 1 , d 11 ) is decreasing in a 1 for any given value of d 11 , (13) will not hold for anyâ 1 (d 11 ) > 0. Therefore, we must have a corner solutionâ 1 (d 11 ) = 0. is obtained by differentiating equation (13) Proof for Theorem 7: For convenience, in this proof, we let P 11 ≡ P 11 (a 1 , d 11 ) and P 12 ≡ P 12 (a 2 , d 12 ). There exist exactly four possible outcomes for the attacker when N = 2:
U
1. Attacks succeed against both targets. This occurs with probability P 11 P 12 , and leads to a positive damage utility of u A (w 1 + w 2 ).
2. The attack against target 1 succeeds, but the attack against target 2 fails. This occurs with probability P 11 (1 − P 12 ), and leads to a positive damage utility of u A1 .
3. The attack against target 2 succeeds, but the attack against target 1 fails. This occurs with probability P 12 (1 − P 11 ), and leads to a positive damage utility of u A2 .
4. Attacks fail against both targets 1 and 2, leading to a zero utility of damage.
Therefore, the attacker's optimization problem (1) becomes: max a1,a2≥0 P 11 P 12 u A (w 1 + w 2 ) + P 11 (1 − P 12 )u A1 + (1 − P 11 )P 12 u A2 − g A (a 1 + a 2 )
By Theorem 3, we know that neither target individually would ever merit positive attacker effort if U 
In order to prove that a risk neutral or risk averse attacker would not attack both targets, without loss of generality, it is sufficient to show that he would not attack target 2 given any positive level of attack effort on target 1. We calculate the marginal total expected utility by taking the derivative of (14) with respect to a 2 , yielding the following marginal total payoff to the attacker:
12 u A (w 1 + w 2 ) + P 11 (−P (a 2 ) 12 )u A1 + (1 − P 11 )P (a 2 ) 12 u A2 − g A (a 1 + a 2 ) = P (a 2 ) 12 u A2 + P (a 2 ) 12 P 11 [u A (w 1 + w 2 ) − u A1 − u A2 ] − g A (a 1 + a 2 ) Similar to the reasoning in the proof of Theorem 3, the attacker will not be interested in attacking target 2 (even the defense is zero) if and only if U 12 (0, 0)P 11 > 0 (see the proof for Lemma 3), and g A (a 1 ) ≥ g A (0), we see that (16) will hold if u A (w 1 + w 2 ) − u A (w 1 ) − u A (w 2 ) ≤ 0 (in other words, if the attacker is risk neutral or risk averse; see Lemma 5). However, for a risk seeking attacker, (16) will not necessarily hold even if (15) is satisfied, since u A (w 1 + w 2 ) may be substantially greater than u A (w 1 ) + u A (w 2 ).
